


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**THE NEW ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
IN NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY:
HOW TO MAKE IT WORK**

BY

Colonel Ernest L. Sutton
United States Army

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
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THE NEW ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

IN NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY:

HOW TO MAKE IT WORK

by

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ABSTRACT

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THE NEW ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
IN NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY:
HOW TO MAKE IT WORK

Introduction

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the need to maintain a large standing armed forces to accomplish our national security strategy has diminished. The President, in assessing our future national security interests, has crafted a National Defense Strategy¹ using a smaller force structure. One of the foundations of this strategy is forward presence.² Forward presence tangibly demonstrates that even in the absence of a traditional threat, the United States continues to have a commitment to our allies and alliances in peacetime, and actively attempts to foster peace and regional stability. In the 1992 National Military Strategy, one of the newly defined roles for our armed forces in forward presence operations is humanitarian assistance³. For the first time humanitarian assistance has become recognized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an essential operational means to accomplish a strategic end in national military strategy.

Although our armed forces has been involved in humanitarian assistance efforts many times in the past⁴, these operations have rarely been part of an integrated strategic effort. Rather, they have been repeatedly accomplished by "ad hoc" organizations with personnel who received only minimal training in preparation for these efforts. Frequently these efforts are less than fully successful or generate negative second and third order effects on

foreign policy objectives. Despite this history, no doctrinal principles have ever been established that military planners can utilize to plan and deploy humanitarian assistance operations. This lack of written guidelines has been a contributing factor to the failure of some of our humanitarian assistance efforts.

Purpose

The author accepts the premise that humanitarian assistance has an essential role in future national security. The purpose of this research paper is to examine how to enhance humanitarian assistance effectiveness in order to make it work better as part of forward presence in national defense strategy. In order for the military planner to understand humanitarian assistance better, this paper highlights the events that led to humanitarian assistance being incorporated as a means to accomplish forward defense in National Military Strategy. It defines humanitarian assistance. It examines how the interagency process works in providing humanitarian assistance and the military's role in this process. With this as a background, historical case studies are analyzed to determine underlying principles common to humanitarian assistance operations that can be incorporated into an effective future humanitarian assistance doctrine. From these principles, recommendations are made that can enhance the effectiveness of future humanitarian assistance operations.

If military planners serving on a combatant Commander-in-Chief's (CINC's) staff are involved in planning humanitarian

assistance operations, they will develop an understanding of these common principles and the interagency process. Failure to understand this has led in the past to apparent short term operational success, but with long term negative effects. Most importantly, failure of humanitarian assistance in forward presence is not in our national security interests.

Methods

In preparing this research study, the author reviewed unpublished after-action reports and published accounts of twenty humanitarian assistance operations to determine the common principles involved in these operations. In order to analyze the complexity of the interagency process, including authorization and approval, the author interviewed sixteen officials and personnel in the Department of Defense Office of Humanitarian Assistance, the State Department Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, the U.S. Agency for International Development and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the U.S. Army Southern Command, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the International Committee of the Red Cross Mission to the United Nations, and the RAND Corporation. Finally, to analyze and consolidate this research, the author used his own experiences as an Army Medical Department officer for twenty-three years, as a Disaster Area Survey Team leader responsible for relief recommendations for earthquake stricken El Asnam, Algeria in 1980, and as a hospital commander preparing medical staff to participate in composite humanitarian assistance

teams to provide Kurdish refugee support in Northern Iraq in 1991.

Scope

This research paper analyses the events which led to humanitarian assistance being recognized for the first time by the Department of Defense in its National Military Strategy as a means to accomplish our national security interests through forward presence. This paper also examines the entire interagency process involved in planning humanitarian assistance, including the complex web of lines of approval and authority. Historical cases studies are examined because no longitudinal studies have been done in the past to determine what principles should be incorporated into a humanitarian assistance doctrine. Analysis of selected historical case studies of various types of operations is used to determine the doctrinal principles that can improve and enhance planning for humanitarian assistance operations. These cases include Presidential directed refugee relief, ambassadorial requested disaster relief, and CINC initiated humanitarian assistance activity in conjunction with military operations. One of the case studies highlights the negative effects in the Third World following a successful refugee relief operation. Finally, underlying principles common to humanitarian assistance are determined and recommendations made that will enhance a humanitarian assistance doctrine to further our national security interests.

Why Humanitarian Assistance Now?

The reality of the future is that the United States will have a much smaller armed force with which to project military power in support of national objectives. Forward presence is replacing forward defense as one of the foundations of national defense strategy. With a much smaller force, that force must be successful the first time it is engaged. Humanitarian assistance is an economy of force that will accomplish the objectives of forward presence. However, it can easily backfire and fail to accomplish objectives if it is not conducted in concert with the multitude of other agencies involved to achieve a single end. Every military planner on a CINC's staff who employs humanitarian assistance must understand the interagency environment and country-specific coordination that can make it work successfully the first time out. This type of planning process is very different from a clearly defined chain of command and "seize-the-objective" approach to which military planners are accustomed.

Humanitarian Assistance Comes to the Forefront

The policies which led to the success of ending the Cold War were largely forged in an atmosphere of rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union. This rivalry did, however, provide a certain amount of predictability. This is no longer the case since the Soviet Union collapsed. Moreover, world peace is far from fact; it remains an aspiration and opportunity.⁵

In President Bush's July 1990 Aspen Speech on United States

defense policy, he stressed that the engagement of armed forces in peacetime was a key consideration for future military planning and was necessary to accomplish our national security objective:

"And what we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing, without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and cold war. And in this world, America remains a pivotal factor for peaceful changes."⁶

Forward presence engages our armed forces in peacetime. This demonstrates our commitment to our allies to foster regional stability, lends credibility to our alliances, and enhances our crisis response capability. Traditional forward presence activities include participating in joint and combined training exercises overseas, visiting ports, military-to-military contacts with other nations, protecting U.S. citizens abroad, and security assistance.

In 1991, two dramatic successful humanitarian assistance operations that the United States wanted to conduct could not be performed without armed forces involvement: the Bangladesh cyclone disaster relief and the Kurdish refugee relief. These two operations highlighted as never before the critical role the military plays in peacetime to achieve national security interests through humanitarian assistance.

In the case of the cyclone in Bangladesh, DoD provided the critical difference in the success of the U.S. disaster relief effort. After the ambassador issued a disaster declaration, the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) initiated

disaster relief operations in conjunction with the United Nations' disaster relief organization. After determining that governmental and non-governmental organizations could not do the job alone, OFDA requested DoD transportation assistance to ferry food and clothing by helicopter to stranded Bangladesh people, and establishment of temporary water purification centers. Both of these requests were for unique DoD assets not available from other relief organizations. DoD has the organization, people, knowledge, equipment, and ability to accomplish these missions. The success of this particular operation was extremely important to our national security interests. At the time of the cyclone, Bangladesh, a non-Arab moslem country, was supporting Operation Desert Storm with troops stationed in the Gulf. This support of the allied coalition was not popular among the people of Bangladesh, but was greatly needed to show the unity of the coalition forces. Providing necessities to the Bangladesh people by soldiers in uniform changed the public's outlook on the United States, and their government's participation in Operation Desert Storm. This successful humanitarian assistance operation contributed to a strategic foreign policy success.

In the case of the Presidential directed Kurdish refugee relief, military forces provided not only humanitarian aid but were prepared to engage in armed conflict in order to protect both the refugees and the relief organizations helping them. Without this military protection the United States and the international community could not have performed this refugee relief operation.

During the Gulf conflict the United States' strategic end was to remove Iraq from Kuwait but not to destroy Iraq and create a power vacuum in the region. Failure of this humanitarian assistance operation would have undermined our strategic success in the Gulf conflict. Once again in 1991, a successful humanitarian assistance operation conducted by DOD contributed to a strategic foreign policy success.

These two operations led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conclude that the U.S. armed forces would increasingly be called upon to provide humanitarian assistance both at home and abroad. As one of the few nations in the world with the means to rapidly and effectively respond to disaster, many nations depend on the United States for assistance. Not only must our forces be prepared to provide humanitarian aid, but they must also be prepared to engage in conflict in order to assist and protect those in need.⁷ This newly defined role in providing humanitarian assistance as part of forward presence operations is, for the first time, part of our 1992 National Military Strategy.

What is Humanitarian Assistance?

Humanitarian assistance operations are programs designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or other non-governmental agencies that have the primary responsibility for providing basic human civic services. When these types of operations are conducted by DOD, they are part forward presence operations and are performed to support the

national security interests of the U.S. They must also complement without duplicating other forms of assistance provided by the U.S. government. Some forms of humanitarian assistance may not extend to individuals or groups engaged in military or paramilitary activities.⁸

Humanitarian assistance in DOD is carried out through several programs: disaster relief, refugee relief, humanitarian and civic assistance (H/CA), and nation assistance. There are important distinctions between these programs. Disaster and refugee relief programs are conducted to mitigate the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions. U.S. Armed Forces involvement is limited in scope and duration. DOD involvement is initiated by Presidential directive or by request of the Department of State.

Humanitarian and civic assistance initiatives are conducted by the DOD in conjunction with military operations. The types of initiatives that can be conducted are specifically provided for by legislative authority. This legislative authority as to what DOD can perform is discussed with examples later in the paper. U.S. Armed Force involvement is again limited in scope and duration.

Nation assistance is a new term that describes the type of support provided to assist a nation to promote its own sustainable development and growth of responsive organizations. Formerly it was called nation building and, earlier, it was known as civil affairs military government. The goal of nation assistance is long term regional stability, pluralistic governments, viable economies,

and processes for orderly change. Nation assistance activities are performed at the request of the Host Nation and are part of the U.S. ambassador's overall country plan. DOD, working in concert with other U.S. agencies, supports this plan as part of the CINC's regional security plan.⁹ The reconstruction of Panama after Operation Just Cause is an example of nation assistance. This paper will not analyze nation assistance because of its long term nature, and because it exceeds the ability of any military organization to accomplish it.

Unlike other military operations involving national security, humanitarian assistance operations are part of an extensive interagency process in which the Department of State is the executive agency. Other agencies may request the military's help. The military's participation can be one of critical support when its unique assets can make an operation possible. In this case the requesting agency provides the funds for this participation. Military participation may also be initiated by a combatant CINC to accomplish his regional strategic taskings as part of the national military strategy. In this later case, Congressional authority and appropriations provide the funds for each CINC to budget, defend, and project H/CA initiatives. The interagency coordination process in humanitarian assistance is critical in order to prevent an uncoordinated action with numerous agencies pursuing different ends. The interagency process can prevent achieving a short term success that later results in a negative long term consequence to national security and foreign policy objectives. This is

especially important for the armed forces in many third world countries where uniformed U.S. military personnel can engender hostility and suspicion no matter how altruistic their its objectives. In FM 100-1, The Army, there is a clear reminder that involvement of the Army in peacetime operations outside the United States requires special sensitivity to the host nation and often involves extensive interagency coordination to achieve our national security interests.

Humanitarian assistance is directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at a tactical level. At the tactical level the military works through the country team. The term "country team" describes in-country interagency coordination among the key members of the U.S. diplomatic mission. Its composition depends on the wishes of the chief of the diplomatic mission, usually an ambassador, the situation, the U.S. departments and agencies represented in country, and the problems to be addressed. The country team coordinates activities to achieve a unified program for the host nations. Although the U.S. military commander is not part of this diplomatic mission, he maintains liaison with, and is usually a member of the country team.

Why is such a bureaucracy required for "tactical" coordination? Preventing a negative result from developing from a humanitarian assistance operation is not the only reason. If, for example, the U.S. military wants to aid in the construction of a rural health clinic, the country team must consider why these

structures are not there in the first place, who will pay the health workers once the clinic is built, and how the clinic will be maintained. Understanding this before initiating a program is essential to achieving a long term success. The country team coordination is a formal point of overlap in coordination.

The next formal overlap of coordination is at the strategic level through the DOD Office of Humanitarian Affairs with coordination with Joint Staff and the Office of the General Counsel. The liaison at the Department of State is the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. At the State Department, the action is approved by the Undersecretary for Policy, the appropriate Regional Affairs Bureau, and the Defense Relations and Security Assistance Office, and the Agency for International Development. If there is a conflict between foreign policy objectives and national security interests, the end of the organizational spectrum is the National Security Council.

The role of the CINC is operational. Humanitarian assistance projects proposed by the CINC to the country team for coordination have both a regional and a country-specific focus in carrying out aspects of the national military strategy.

All these projects, whether rapidly assessed and executed, as in disaster and refugee relief, or long term, require deep understanding of the country's customs and culture in order to be successful. The military cannot do this in isolation. This is why it is imperative that the military planner understand how to use the interagency process in planning humanitarian assistance.

Historical Perspective

Disaster Relief

Despite the diversity of different types of humanitarian assistance operations performed by DOD to support our national security interests, there exist common principles which can be incorporated into an effective doctrine for military planners. Three types of case studies are selected for analysis: the 1976 Guatemalan earthquake disaster relief, the 1991 Kurdish refugee relief, and the 1988 Honduran humanitarian assistance initiative.

Since 1975, at the request of the Secretary of State, DoD has participated in fifty-four humanitarian assistance operations. Forty of these have been for disaster relief.¹⁰ The 1976 Guatemalan earthquake disaster relief is selected because it was a turning point in interagency coordination, and is an example of how disaster relief can be misconceived.¹¹ This was the starting point for the change in focus from an emphasis on providing a massive surge of relief to encouraging self-reliance and mutual aid agreements.

The response to this disaster was typical of the 1970s. A disaster declaration was made by the Ambassador and sent directly to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).¹² A Disaster Assessment Survey Team (DAST) was provided by the U.S. Army at the request of the OFDA the next day. The amount of aid sent by the U.S. was excessive for what was needed. The acute medical crisis was resolved in seventy-two hours. Despite this, one hundred fifteen tons of medical supplies and a U.S. Army field hospital

began arriving on the third day. This type of aid was not needed. The field hospital was deployed without coordination with the local health care system. Not only was it greatly underutilized for disaster related injuries, the medical staff didn't speak the language and practiced a level of medicine unadapted to the customs of the people it served.¹³ Although there was no food shortage in Guatemala, hundreds of thousands of pounds of food was sent, causing the local price of corn to crash, heaping new hardships on Guatemalan farmers. The United States' strong response was in part due to a desire to support the Guatemalan government at a time when it was fighting an insurgency.

The problems of sending excess medical aid and so many other supplies and food, just because we have the ability to deliver, was characteristic of many of our disaster relief efforts in the 1970s. The resulting confusion actually made relief more difficult. In 1976, the OFDA's congressional charter was amended to include prevention, mitigation and preparedness activities to avoid such problems in U.S. disaster relief in the future.

As international disaster relief matured in the 1980's, both the role of the DOD and OFDA changed. The supportive role of DOD was largely confined to its ability to rapidly respond with a Disaster Area Survey Team and having the equipment needed to communicate the extent of a given disaster and recommendations for relief assistance to our ambassador from remote sites. OFDA disaster assistance relief efforts were largely confined to credits and funds to non-governmental agencies (NGOs) that specialize in

disaster relief, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.¹⁴

In the 1991 Bangladesh cyclone disaster, DOD provided the critical difference in the success of Bangladesh's relief effort. In conjunction with the UN disaster relief organization, OFDA requested transportation assistance to ferry food and clothing by helicopter to stranded Bangladesh people, and to set up temporary water purification centers. Both of these requests were for unique DOD assets not duplicated by NGOs. DOD's participation tangibly demonstrated by its forward presence its role in supporting our foreign policy and national security interests.

A new focus in international disaster relief initiated by the UN is their declaration of the 1990's as being "The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction."¹⁵ Although the U.S. had provided a massive amount of relief into Nicaragua and Guatemala over the last twenty-five years, it was not until 1989 and 1990 that at the national level did these countries establish functioning committees with the political commitment to address these issues long term. A new international philosophy towards relief has developed. Host nation governments must not depend on massive international relief; they must plan to be self-reliant and develop mutual aid agreements.¹⁶ Through CINC initiated humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations which is discussed later in this paper, DOD can assist host nations in training their military in disaster reduction training similar to our national guard. This type of

forward presence will strengthen our national security interests by training developing nations' militaries for their role in a democratic society.

Refugee Operations

In a striking departure from the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of its member nations, the UN Security Council on April 5, 1991, adopted Resolution 688. This resolution, for the first time, established that a humanitarian emergency, such as the mass exodus of the Kurds who fled toward the Iraq border, could be a threat to international peace and stability. Resolution 688 required Iraq to admit UN humanitarian personnel to their country, and to permit the United Nations and other agencies providing humanitarian assistance to have access to all people in need. The President, in conjunction with the international community in Operation Provide Comfort, authorized DOD to provide refugee disaster relief to the Kurds in Northern Iraq.

This type of humanitarian assistance was unique in that not only was the right of the United Nations to intervene in internal conflict within a sovereign member country established, but UN forces were prepared to engage in conflict in order to assist and protect those in need. Nongovernmental organizations cannot do this. The use of force is clearly a capability of the DOD. This newly defined concept in providing humanitarian assistance in both peacetime and conflict is part of National Military Strategy.¹⁷

This refugee operation in Northern Iraq also emphasizes that if military medical units are utilized for this type of mission, expansion teams and equipment must be planned to handle the increased population of children and women. Also, continuous liaison with the Department of State is essential in order to transfer the refugee operations over to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.¹⁸

Although Operation Provide Comfort is seen as a foreign policy success that supported our national security interests, it did have an unexpected negative reaction. In November, 1991, there was a Western proposal that the UN appoint a high commissioner for humanitarian assistance to coordinate the world's response in floods, famines, and other natural disasters. It was defeated in the UN General Assembly because developing countries feared it could give foreigners a pretext for meddling in their internal political affairs.¹⁹ For the military planner of humanitarian assistance operations, this may have a significant bearing on developing countries permitting the U.S. to conduct these operations with uniformed military personnel. The Ambassador's country team can anticipate particular host nation sensitivities that can make military humanitarian and civic assistance inadvisable.

Disaster and refugee relief operations are by their very nature sudden occurrences. DOD involvement occurs when directed by the President or after the host nation requests assistance. In the latter case, the U.S. ambassador declares an emergency and OFDA

officially requests DOD services. Military participation is usually of short duration until there can be a transition to civic authority. Our National Military Security recognizes the U.S. as one of the few nations in the world with the means to rapidly and effectively respond to disaster and that many nations depend on us for assistance.²⁰

CINC Initiated Humanitarian Assistance:

Congress Provides Legislative Authority

Congress has recognized the role the military plays in providing humanitarian assistance. Starting in 1986, Congress has provided statutory authority in public law for the military to conduct humanitarian and civic action assistance initiatives in conjunction with military operations if they promote national security interests. These programs are part of Title 10, United States Code: Armed Forces. Starting in 1990, each CINC must budget, defend, and project funds for humanitarian assistance.

These programs are administered by the regional CINCs directly under Title 10, Chapter 20, Section 401 with approval authority vested in the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) / Internal Security Assistance and the Deputy ASD / Global Affairs. These operations are defined by law and limited to:

- medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country
- construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems

- well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities
- rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities

Country team coordination, including concurrence by the U.S. ambassador and US Agency for International Development director, starts the interagency process. Specifically, the director certifies that the project compliments, but does not duplicate or otherwise conflict with economic or social programs of other U.S. government agencies. After DOD approval, the Department of State gives final concurrence approval. Although overlap and conflict in the administration of Title 10 humanitarian and civic assistance initiatives is prevented in the individual country, it becomes readily apparent with the CINC's program and funding limitations his program will be based upon regional priorities of national security interests. The Department of State and our ambassadors direct foreign policy but, for nearly all programs, other governmental agencies control funding initiatives. The interagency process, except for the National Security Council or the President, must set priorities if international priorities are to be set for all governmental agencies to follow.

In the United States Southern Command, humanitarian and civic assistance initiatives are an essential part of the CINC's theater strategy to support developing democracies. His forward presence priorities are: counter-drug operations, negotiated settlement in El Salvador, maintain and support the democratic process in Panama,

and growth of professionalism in Latin American militaries. His humanitarian assistance program is designed to substantially enrich the infrastructure of the nations involved and cooperate with host nation forces.²¹

One such approved operation is *Fuertes Caminos '92*. Lasting twenty weeks, it will include 6,000 soldiers from the Army National Guard, Army Reserves, and Air Force civil engineering units. They will be working in direct cooperation with the Panamanian ministries of public works, health, education, water works and military. Only time will tell if these cooperative humanitarian and civic assistance initiatives will strengthen the friendship between the people of Panama and the United States and our national security interests.²² Even though it is difficult to measure the positive impact on public opinion in the short term, Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that these initiatives are in the long term interests of our national security. This is an example of the change in the way our armed forces are deployed in forward presence operations, as the focus of our national security policy shifts from one of containment to one of engagement.²³

Another member of the country team, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), is a valuable contributor to the interagency process. This agency can assess the impact of forward presence on the attitudes of the local populace, foster the growth of public support for U.S. policy objectives, and counter hostile attempts to distort and frustrate U.S. policies and national security interests.²⁴ While our armed forces are visible for a short

duration, the USIA remains in a country long term, has established working relations within a host nation, and can ensure a long term success of forward presence operations.

Section 2010 of Title 10 provides authority for DOD to fund personal expenses of defense personnel from developing nations to attend conferences, meetings, and seminars when such attendance is in the interest of the United States. The U.S. European Command, through 7th Medical Command, starting using this program in 1990 to provide training to Sub-Saharan Africa military medical personnel in acute trauma life support instructor training, and in administering mass casualty training exercises. This medical training is useful not only in combat, but also in natural disaster reduction, and allows the nation to become more self reliant.

Do these programs really help, and do they lead to long lasting infrastructure and institutionalizing of technology transfer through training? This has seldom been studied. In developing countries, a recurrent continued lesson learned is that long term success remains a case-by-case occurrence. Devolution of authority, responsibility and leadership have only come about in areas where there is a long-term political commitment by the host nation and our involvement is part of a long term development plan and not a "one shot in and out operation." Just like too much massive disaster assistance, a lack of a well thought out plan may do more harm than good.²⁵ Since the military's involvement is usually of limited scope and duration, coordination with the country team will insure our humanitarian assistance is part of a

long term development plan.

DOD's participation in humanitarian assistance as part of the National Military Strategy not been without its critics. Senator George Mitchell, Senate Majority Leader, sharply criticized the President on CNN on 2 October 1991 for helping the Bangladesh cyclone victims instead of supporting the extension of unemployment insurance for Americans. Senator Randall calls humanitarian assistance "sand down a rat hole". The media has referred to humanitarian assistance as the Pentagon's scramble to stay relevant²⁶ and Operation Feel Good.²⁷

Even with this criticism, however, Congress still continues to provide an annual appropriation for Title 10 humanitarian and civic assistance for our armed forces to promote our national security interests. Representative Dante Fascell, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, summarized his committee's view that humanitarian assistance plays a supporting role to foreign policy when it is intelligently employed in conjunction with competent host nation policies. The committee also recognized that it relieves suffering for millions of victims of disasters. Their hope is that humanitarian assistance will promote a long climb out of poverty for many nations.²⁸

Principles of Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance

Since the mid-seventies, both Western governmental and non-governmental relief agencies have greatly matured in conceiving the

appropriate type of aid that is needed for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. The problems of sending excess medical aid, supplies, and food have been recognized. The ability to coordinate the efforts of various governmental agencies through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance which, in turn, coordinates on the international level with appropriate United Nations agencies, has been established.

During the last twenty years, principles of providing an appropriate response to disaster relief and humanitarian assistance have evolved. All of these principles, at one time or another, have appeared on U.S. military after action reports in some form. These have not, however, been incorporated into U.S. military doctrine. With the inclusion of humanitarian assistance in the National Military Strategy as part of the peacetime forward presence of our armed forces, the following principles need to be more widely understood.

1. Support the existing delivery system: a stand alone American presence that does not develop infrastructure will accomplish little in the long run. In fact it may be seen as unwanted competition or cause resentment.

2. Develop self-reliance: The establishment of a medical supply depot system and its transition to local management in the 1972 Nicaraguan earthquake is an excellent example of infrastructure development.²⁹

3. Use low technology assistance: Providing a level of medical care and training that cannot be maintained after the assistance

project is over leads to frustration and resentment.

4. Emphasize disaster reduction training and preventive medicine: Disaster reduction training is accomplished by massive casualty training and organization of disaster health services. Preventive medicine including sanitation, immunization, health education, and vector control accomplishes more in the long term.

5. Understand and respect local customs and language: The local populace will not cooperate with humanitarian assistance team members who are unable to explain procedures in the local language, or whose procedures are in violation of local customs and taboos. The failure to understand these principles and failure to provide civil affairs liaison personnel to compensate for this lack prevented the 1976 Guatemalan disaster relief from being fully effective. Even what may appear to be a simple task such as giving immunizations may be prevented by local customs. In many Moslem countries adolescent females will not be permitted to be immunized by male immunization teams.³⁰

Recommendations

The supportive role of the military in the interagency process for disaster and refugee relief and humanitarian assistance has been endorsed by the President. Congress has passed the necessary legislation for implementing it. Humanitarian assistance has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is part of our National Military Strategy. In order for the military to be

successful in providing humanitarian assistance the common underlying principles involved must be incorporated into current doctrine. The following recommendations will enhance this process:

Develop cellular units that have both the specialist and equipment packages to perform humanitarian assistance missions. Units already exist to enhance the health service support of fixed structure units on the battlefield. These units are only called up when the need arises. An example of such a unit used by the Army is Team LD, Epidemiology Service. It provides epidemiological investigation and evaluation of conditions affecting the health of a supported military and civilian population. To determine the type and organization of these units, a process similiar to that which formed the 1983 joint Deployable Medical System is needed. A historical analysis was done on the types of battlefield injuries incurred by U.S. armed forces since World War II. A joint military committee of experts determined what personnel and equipment were needed for each type of battlefield injuries. Regrettably refugee and disaster relief analysis was specifically excluded from this process. From this process and the knowledge of the most likely percent of injuries the modules for the joint Deployable Medical System was determined. At present each type of mission is task organized on the basis of personal knowledge of the senior leader. These leaders will not have the benefit of the vast amount of experience that has gone into these operations over the years if these principles are not incorporated into doctrine that is taught along with battlefield

support.

These units may not be used very often, but formal training exercises for their use is just as important as battlefield exercises. Exercises in the command and control of the interagency process involving not just the military but the country team and the OFDA are equally important for humanitarian assistance to be effective.

Conclusion

When Secretary of State Baker outlined the U.S. foreign policy objectives and the mechanisms to achieve them, DOD's role in peace was affirmed to be an essential component of the activist approach to diplomacy the U.S. is taking in a changing world. An approach that mobilizes and integrates all the elements of national power must be developed, whether it is through the mechanism of trade and investment policies, creative responsibility sharing with our global partnerships, strengthening the U.S., or multilateral mechanisms through international financial institutions.³¹

Without public support and the will of the American people, the ability of the United States to influence world events and not only to be reactive to them will be seriously threatened. During the 50th year remembrance of Pearl Harbor, President Bush warned against any relapse into political and economic isolation.

"We stand here today on the site of a tragedy spawned by isolationism. And it is here must learn - and this time avoid - the dangers of isolationism."³²

In order for the U.S. to achieve its national security

interests in peacetime, it must continue to be a leader in world affairs and promote democratic values and peace. The use of humanitarian assistance in the forward presence operations of our armed forces is one effective means for achieving this goal.

ENDNOTES

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5. George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), p.11.
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